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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 31, 2020, in VIP Products LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Properties,
Inc.,1 the Ninth Circuit held that a dog toy was an “expressive work” and not
a commercial product, thus entitling it to a heightened level of protection
under the First Amendment and extending the use of the Rogers test. This
decision diverged from the Second Circuit’s application of the Lanham Act,
causing a difference in the application of the Rogers test.2 Accordingly,
Lanham Act plaintiffs in the Second Circuit are subjected to the Rogers test
when the product is expressive but not when the product is commercial.3
The Second Circuit considers humor as one factor to determine whether a
work is expressive rather than commercial.4 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit,
deems humor as per se expressive, and therefore applies the Rogers test
broadly.5 This bifurcated analysis of the Lanham Act will eventually require
Supreme Court intervention.
In VIP Products, the Ninth Circuit ruled that VIP Products’ dog toy was
an “expressive work” entitled to a heightened level of protection under the
First Amendment and thus the Lanham Act.6 The determination was rooted
in VIP Products’ humorous use of the mark.7 Accordingly, the court found
the likelihood-of-confusion test was not the standard the district court should
have relied on when interpreting the Lanham Act.8
1. 953 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2020).
2. See Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, December 2019: Trademark &

Copyright Litigation Update, JD SUPRA (Jan. 3, 2020) [hereinafter December 2019
Update], https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/december-2019-trademark-copyright-282
29/ (describing how Ninth and Second Circuits deviate in their application of the Rogers
test).
3. See, e.g., Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 812–13 (2d Cir.
1999) (finding that when a product uses humor alone, it remains commercial and does
not require the Rogers test as it is not an expressive work).
4. Id. at 812 (considering the “parody defense,” which allows for “considerable
leeway to parodists whose expressive works aim their parodic commentary at a
trademark or a trademarked product”).
5. Compare id. (finding that humor cannot be the only factor in determining
whether a work is expressive), with VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1174–76 (finding that
humor alone can constitute an expressive work).
6. VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1175–76.
7. See id. at 1174–75 (finding the toy an expressive work because it “communicates
a ‘humorous message’ . . . using word play to alter the serious phrase that appears on a
Jack Daniel’s bottle”).
8. See id. at 1174 (stating that the likelihood-of-confusion test fails to consider First
Amendment freedom of expression in “artistic expression,” thus the Rogers test is
required); see also David Muradyan, Likelihood of Confusion Analysis Under the
Lanham Act, IP LAW BLOG (Aug. 15, 2012), https://www.theiplawblog.com/
2012/08/articles/trademark-law/likelihood-of-confusion-analysis-under-the-lanham-act/
(listing the likelihood-of-confusion factors: “(1) strength of the mark, (2) proximity [of]
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The Ninth Circuit’s decision to define a dog toy as an expressive work
because of its humorous mark places the issue of whether a product should
be looked at as commercial or expressive at the forefront. If humor is
sufficient to define a work as expressive, plaintiffs are unduly burdened in
trademark issues9 This use of “expressive work” also enables courts to overapply the Rogers test, a very high threshold to pass.10 The Ninth Circuit’s
decision to bypass any consideration of the likelihood-of-confusion test
creates very stringent criteria for any plaintiff claiming unfair use or
trademark ifnfringement.11
The Second Circuit created the Rogers test under the Lanham Act and has
been consistent in its interpretation,12 being careful not to expand its use to
commercial products.13 The Second Circuit also maintains the purpose of the
Lanham Act by utilizing the likelihood-of-confusion analysis before
applying the Rogers test.14 This limited use of the Rogers test allows the
Second Circuit to adhere to the purpose of the Lanham Act, which is to
balance First Amendment rights and trademark protection as it applies “only
where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the
public interest in free expression.”15
the goods or services, (3) similarity of the marks, (4) evidence of actual confusion, (5)
the marketing channels used, (6) the type of goods or services and the degree of care
likely to be exercised by the purchasers of the defendant’s product, (7) defendant’s intent
in selecting the mark, and (8) the likelihood of expansion of the product lines”).
9. See Jonathan Montcalm, Has Fox’s “Empire” Ended the Battle? Ninth Circuit
Expands Scope of Permissible Promotion of Expressive Works, DORSEY (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://thetmca.com/has-foxs-empire-ended-the-battle-ninth-circuit-expands-scope-ofpermissible-promotion-of-expressive-works/ (stating the Ninth Circuit has granted
significant leeway to expressive works, thus creating protections for uses that were
previously unlawful).
10. See Joshua Simmons, Trademarks and the First Amendment: Litigation Trends,
N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 6, 2020, 3:04 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/
11/06/trademarks-and-the-first-amendment-litigation-trends/ (quoting ESS Ent. 2000 v.
Rock Star Videos, 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008)) (noting that the artistic use of a
trademark will not be found to infringe upon the holder’s rights unless “the use of the
mark has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or if it has some artistic
relevance, unless it explicitly misleads as to the source of content of the work”). See
generally id. (using Ninth Circuit cases as examples to show the expansion of expressive
work).
11. See December 2019 Update, supra note 2 (stating Second Circuit plaintiffs do
not need to meet this same high bar, but rather must only prove likelihood-of-confusion).
12. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (creating the Rogers
test: (a) the title of the work has some artistic relevance to the underlying work; and (b)
that the title is not explicitly misleading as to the source or content of the work).
13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., 953 F.3d
1170 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 20-365).
14. See December 2019 Update, supra note 2.
15. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999; Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
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The Ninth Circuit has adopted the Rogers test in a way that expands the
plain language of the Lanham Act and, therefore, has broadened the test
beyond its original purpose.16 This is compared to the Second Circuit, which
created the Rogers test and continues to stay within the framework of the
Lanham Act.17 The Second Circuit consistently separates commercial
products from expressive works, and when it determines a work is
commercial, it only requires the likelihood-of-confusion test for a Lanham
Act plaintiff.18 However, if the work is deemed expressive, the Second
Circuit uses the Rogers test but in a way that is consistent with the plain
language of the Lanham Act.
This Note distinguishes the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of expressive
work and use of the Rogers test from the Second Circuit’s. Section II will
outline the Lanham Act and follow the development of the Rogers test in the
Second and Ninth Circuits. More specifically, it will highlight the expansion
of the Ninth Circuit’s use of “expressive work” and the Rogers test. Section
III will analyze the differences in the use of the Lanham Act and the Rogers
tests applied by the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit.
II. BACKGROUND
The Lanham Act serves to protect federally registered marks from similar
marks that would confuse consumers.19 The Rogers test was developed as a
tool to help aid the legislature enforce trademark infringement issues.20
A. Origins of the Lanham Act
In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127.21
The Lanham Act provides federal guidelines and procedures to regulate the
enforcement of trademark rights.22 To prevail, the Lanham Act requires a

16. See Jared Kagan, Bad Spaniels Make Bad Law: Ninth Circuit Says Dog Toy is
an Expressive Work Entitled to First Amendment Protection, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 3,
2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/04/03/bad-spaniels-make-bad-law/id=1203
53/.
17. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999; Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g
Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 493–94 (2d Cir. 1989); Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli,
164 F.3d 806, 812–13 (2d Cir. 1999).
18. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 164 F.3d at 813.
19. Lanham Act, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/lanham_act (last visited Feb.. 4, 2022).
20. Ivan Blomqvist, The Rogers Test: Free Speech v. Trademark Protection,
MOELLER IP (Feb. 12, 2021), https://moellerip.com/the-rogers-test-free-speech-v-trade
mark-protection/.
21. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
22. Id.
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plaintiff to demonstrate that “(1) the plaintiff has a valid and legally
protectable mark; (2) the plaintiff owns the mark; and (3) the defendant’s use
of the mark to identify goods or services causes a likelihood of confusion.”23
In the Second Circuit, if a work is not expressive under the Lanham Act, the
likelihood-of-confusion factors are used.24 However, when the work is
expressive under the Lanham Act, the Second Circuit uses the Rogers test .25
The Rogers test applies to expressive works “only where the public
interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free
expression.”26 The Rogers test intended to strike a balance between
trademark rights and First Amendment rights.27 Therefore, when an
expressive work is at issue, a Lanham Act claimant must show the work is
either “not artistically relevant to the underlying work” or “explicitly
misleads consumers as to the source or content of the work” to prevail.28
B. Creation and Progression of the Rogers Test
The Rogers test originated in the Second Circuit in 1989 from the
landmark case Rogers v. Grimaldi.29 There, the court analyzed a false
advertising claim from a famous duo suing Grimaldi over a movie title under
the Lanham Act.30 The duo, Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, believed that
the film “Ginger and Fred,” which depicted a famous cabaret duo in a
satirical way, portrayed them and would lead the audience to believe Rogers
and Astaire were involved with the film.31
Grimaldi claimed that the title was free speech protected under the First
Amendment.32 The District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted summary judgment for Grimaldi as the film was an artistic
expression and not a commercial product.33 Rogers subsequently appealed

23. Id.; Lanham Act, supra note 19.
24. See Muradyan, supra note 8 (listing the likelihood-of-confusion factors).
25. David Grossman & Mariah Volk, Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., LOEB & LOEB

LLP (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2018/11/gordon-vdrape-creative-inc.
26. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
27. See id.
28. VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., 953 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2020);
Muradyan, supra note 8.
29. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
30. Id. at 996.
31. Id. at 996–97.
32. Id. at 997.
33. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 875 F.2d 994
(2d Cir. 1989).
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the district court’s decision.34 The appellate court affirmed the district
court’s decision but found that the Lanham Act could apply to titles of artistic
works.35 Subsequently, the Second Circuit developed a standard for artistic
works, which stated that the Lanham Act “should be construed to apply to
artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion
outweighs the public interest in free expression.”36
Under this standard, artistic relevance is analyzed first.37 A title is
artistically relevant if it has some artistic relevance to the underlying work.38
If it does have artistic relevance, then the Second Circuit analyzes whether
the “title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.”39
Through this new standard, the Second Circuit determined that the title had
artistic relevance to the underlying work and did not explicitly mislead
consumers.40 Therefore, it affirmed the district court’s decision and, as a
result, created the Rogers test.41 After this decision, when there is an
“expressive work,” the Rogers test interprets the Lanham Act to apply when
deciding if consumer confusion exceeds the right to free expression.42
“[T]hat balance will normally not support applying the Act,” unless the two
aforementioned prongs are fulfilled43 with regard to the title‘s creative
connection and the impression that perceived connection might cause. 44
i. Second Circuit’s Rogers Test Prongs
As noted above, the Rogers test consists of two prongs: 1) “at least some
artistic relevance” and 2) “not explicitly misleading as to the content of the
work.”45 The first prong of the Rogers test is a factual issue that the courts
34. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996.
35. See id. at 998 (finding that titles counted as an expressive work and thus are

entitled to protection).
36. Id. at 999.
37. See id. at 998 (analyzing artistic relevance before analyzing if a work is explicitly
misleading as to its content).
38. Id. at 999.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1001–02 (concluding that although the title may be misleading to some,
“the title is entirely truthful as to its content” and “has an ironic meaning that is relevant
to the film’s content;” therefore, the Lanham Act claim must fail).
41. Lynn M. Jordan & David M. Kelly, Another Decade of Rogers v. Grimaldi:
Continuing to Balance the Lanham Act with the First Amendment Rights of Creators of
Artistic Works, 109 TRADEMARK REP. 833, 837 (2019).
42. See Grossman & Volk, supra note 25 (defining the main purpose of the Rogers
test as ensuring that customers are not confused on the source of the work).
43. See id.
44. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1000.
45. Id.
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consider on a case-by-case basis.46 The bar establishing “artistic relevance”
is low; defendants simply have to prove that the work rises just above what
the court considers “artistic relevance.”47
Conversely, the second prong of the Rogers test requires a more in-depth
analysis.48 Accordingly, the Second Circuit employs a variety of factors to
evaluate the challenged work’s likelihood-of-confusion.49 If there is
confusion, then the Second Circuit analyzes whether that confusion is
“particularly compelling.”50 Where the confusion is “particularly
compelling,” then the Second Circuit considers the work “explicitly
misleading,”51 meaning it fails the Rogers test, thus violating the Lanham
Act.
ii. Second Circuit’s Rogers Test Development
In 1993, the Second Circuit, in Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v.
Publications International,52 illustrated its use of the Rogers test.53
Publications International, Ltd. (“PIL”) published a book titled “Welcome to
Twin Peaks: A Complete Guide to Who’s Who and What’s What,” based
on the first season of the show “Twin Peaks.”54 On the book’s cover, PIL
placed a disclaimer that the show was not affiliated with the book.55 Twin
Peaks Production sued in the Southern District of New York alleging
copyright infringement, trademark infringement, unfair competition, and
trademark dilution.56 PIL asserted fair use and First Amendment defenses.57
The district court found for Twin Peaks Productions on all matters besides
trademark dilution and rejected PIL’s defenses.58 Subsequently, PIL
46. 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 31:144.50 (5th ed. 2021).
47. Jordan & Kelly, supra note 41, at 837 (stating that the court is simply responsible
for determining that artistic relevance exists and not how much of it exists).
48. See 3 ANNE GILSON LALONDE & JEROME GILSON, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS
§ 13.24 (2021).
49. See Jordan & Kelly, supra note 41, at 850–51.
50. See id. at 851 (“If there is no likelihood-of-confusion, the analysis is complete.”).
51. Id.; see December 2019 Update, supra note 2.
52. 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1370.
55. Id. at 1370–71, 1739 (noting that PIL published the book based on the show
without authorization from the network or show creators).
56. Id. at 1371.
57. Id. (asserting that their product was just using freedom of speech and not
infringing on a trademark).
58. Id.; see also Twin Peaks Prods., Inc., v. Publ’ns Int’l, 778 F. Supp. 1247
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.59 On appeal, the Second
Circuit was “concerned that the District Court failed to recognize the special
concerns implicated by the Lanham Act claims against titles of works of
artistic expression.”60 Therefore, the Second Circuit applied the Rogers
test.61
The Second Circuit recognized that the first prong of Rogers was satisfied
by the artistic relevance to the underlying work.62 When analyzing whether
a work is “explicitly misleading,” the Second Circuit applies the likelihoodof-confusion test.63 Therefore, the Second Circuit remanded the issue of
“explicitly misleading” to the district court to apply the likelihood-ofconfusion test and thus, complete the full and correct analysis of the issues.64
Twin Peaks Productions demonstrates that when the Second Circuit deems
a work “expressive,” it analyzes the second prong of Rogers differently than
the Ninth Circuit.65 The Second Circuit’s analysis of the second prong
contrasts with the Ninth Circuit’s because it analyzes whether an “expressive
work” is misleading based on the likelihood-of-confusion factors.66
The Second Circuit does not consider a product an “expressive work”
when only humor is used and, therefore, does not apply the Rogers test in
such cases.67 The Second Circuit demonstrated this with its holding in
Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli 68 where the plaintiff filed a trademarkinfringement lawsuit against a motorcycle repair business operating under
the name The Hog Farm. Harley-Davidson alleged that “Hog” was a
trademark for its motorcycles and this use of the term would prompt
consumers to incorrectly associate the two. Though the defendant relied on
a parody defense,69 the court noted that for a product to be considered an
“expressive work,” it must provide commentary on the original trademark.70
However, humor alone is insufficient commentary on an original trademark
when it fails to offer a comment with “critical bearing on the substance or
59.
60.
61.
62.

Twin Peaks Prods., Inc, 996 F.2d at 1371.
Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1378–79.
See id. at 1379 (finding the work artistically relevant to the underlying work as
it was a title of a book and was related to the book).
63. See id. The Second Circuit relies on the eight factors developed in Polaroid
Corp. v. Polaroid Electronics. Corp. to guide its likelihood-of-confusion analysis.
64. Id. at 1379–80.
65. December 2019 Update, supra note 2.
66. Id.
67. Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999).
68. Id. at 806.
69. See supra note 4 (describing the parody defense).
70. See Harley-Davidson, Inc., 164 F.3d at 813.

2022

JACK DANIEL'S HIGHLIGHTS

525

style of the original composition.”71 The Second Circuit held that “a
trademark parody that endeavors to promote primarily non-expressive
products” is not entitled to First Amendment protection.72 Therefore, the
Second Circuit uses the likelihood-of-confusion test to determine if a
trademark has infringed the plaintiff’s protected trademark.73
Thus, in the Second Circuit, Lanham Act plaintiffs are not required to pass
the Rogers test requirements, rather, they must only satisfy the likelihoodof-confusion test when a defendant uses a trademark to humorously promote
a product.74 This case demonstrates that the Second Circuit only applies the
likelihood-of-confusion factors and not the Rogers test when a work is not
expressive.75
C. Ninth Circuit’s Rogers Test Progression
After the landmark case of Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Rogers test has not
only been used by the Second Circuit, but has also been adopted by the Ninth
Circuit.76 Originally, the Rogers test was used to analyze whether titles of
expressive works were infringing on other works.77 However, when the
Ninth Circuit adopted the Rogers test, it expanded the test’s application.78
In 2017, Twentieth Century Fox TV v. Empire Distribution, Inc.,79 the
Ninth Circuit held that Fox’s use of the mark “Empire” in the show’s name
and its promotional activities were protected by the First Amendment.80 This
holding applied to all of Fox’s uses of “Empire,” including those auxiliary
to protected expressive works.81 This expansion meant that Fox could use
71. See id. (requiring that the humor provide additional commentary to constitute an
expressive work).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 813–14.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. See December 2019 Update, supra note 2 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit
adopted the Rogers test to evaluate expressive works pursuant to the Lanham Act).
77. Meredith M. Wilkes & Jacqueline K.S. Lee, Litigating the First Amendment
Defense in the Video Game Context, INTA BULLETIN (Sept. 15, 2013), https://www.
jonesday.com/files/Publication/46dc838c-ffa4-4cf6-b788-75a28c6642eb/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/29d1bd39-b132-4f42-a6d6-ecfd9dbfb03c/LitigatingtheFirstAm
endm.pdf.
78. Kagan, supra note 16.
79. 875 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2017).
80. See id. at 1197 (finding that underlying works using marks deserve protection as
they are an extension of an expressive work).
81. See id. (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 n.5 (2d Cir. 1989)) (using
a footnote from Rogers to classify auxiliary products as an extension of expressive
works).
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the trademark “Empire” in promoting shows, “live musical performances,
radio play, and consumer goods such as shirts and champagne glasses.”82
Categorizing supplementary products as “expressive works” broadens the
scope of permissible trademarks to include “promotional” products that
create revenue and commercial goods.83
Unlike the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has held that likelihood-ofconfusion test is irrelevant to determine whether trademark use in an
expressive work is explicitly misleading.84 This is because the Ninth Circuit
finds that the “likelihood-of-confusion test provides insufficient protection
against a trademark owner’s ability to control public discourse.”85 Instead,
the Ninth Circuit requires an “explicit indication, overt claim, or explicit
misstatement” to determine if a product is “explicitly misleading.”86
Notably, the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to use these factors to determine
whether a trademark used in an expressive work is explicitly misleading.87
In 2018, the Ninth Circuit further expanded the reach of expressive works
in Gordon v. Drape Creative88 by using humor to classify a commercial
product as an expressive work.89 Christopher Gordon created a YouTube
video using the catchphrase “Honey Badger Don’t Care.”90 After the phrase
became widely popular, Gordon trademarked the phrase and used it to sell
products.91 Drape Creative later used this catchphrase in greeting and
birthday cards92 prompting Gordon to sue the company in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California. The court granted
summary judgment for the defendant using the Rogers test93 and Gordon
appealed.94

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Act).

Id. at 1195.
See Montcalm, supra note 9.
Twentieth Century Fox TV, 875 F.3d at 1198.
Id. at 1197.
See id. at 1199 (finding that these factors were more in line with the Lanham

87. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5–6, VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props.,
953 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 20-365) (stating the Ninth Circuit is the outlier while
the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits do not require as high of
a threshold).
88. 909 F.3d 257 (9th Cir. 2018).
89. See id. (finding a greeting card an expressive work because it was humorous).
90. Id. at 260.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 260–63 (finding that Drape did not receive authorization to use the phrase,
even though the two parties had communicated about the idea in the past).
93. Id. at 260–61.
94. Id. at 263.
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In its analysis, the court first found that the greeting cards were expressive
works protected under the First Amendment because they conveyed
messages to consumers through their humorous words and images.95 The
standard of “conveying a message” expands “expressive works” to include
any product if it adds any amount of humor or critique.96 Then, the Court
applied the Rogers test and remanded the issues back to the district court.97
i. Ninth Circuit’s Rogers Test Prongs
Despite their deviations in application, the Ninth and Second Circuits use
the same prongs for the Rogers test. Both Circuits require: 1) “at least some
artistic relevance,” and that products are 2) “not explicitly misleading as to
the content of the work.”98 However, the breakdown of those prongs in the
Ninth Circuit is different.99 Relying on Second Circuit case precedent, the
Ninth Circuit interpreted the first prong of the Rogers test as establishing a
standard 100 that the degree of artistic relevance “merely must be above
zero.”101 This standard is considered on a factual basis and does not require
judges to “engage in artistic analysis.”102
When analyzing the second prong the Ninth Circuit disregards the
likelihood-of-confusion analysis.103 Instead, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis is
rooted in a multi-part elemental test that considers: whether the work
“‘explicitly misled consumers’ through an ‘explicit indication,’ ‘overt
claim,’ or ‘explicit misstatement’ that caused consumer confusion.”104
ii. The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis of VIP Prods. LLC v.
Jack Daniel’s Props.
In 2020, the Ninth Circuit heard VIP Products LLC.105 The court analyzed
whether a dog toy was an “expressive work” and, therefore, entitled to First
Amendment protection.106 Jack Daniel’s argued that the dog toy was a
95. Id. at 268.
96. See Kagan, supra note 16 (stating that the Ninth Circuit has strayed from

traditionally expressive work by expanding its definition to include humor).
97. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 271.
98. December 2019 Update, supra note 2.
99. Id.
100. See Jordan & Kelly, supra note 41, at 837 (stating that, in the Second Circuit,
“works that ha[ve] ‘no artistic relevance’ [are] the only works that would be exempt”).
101. See id.
102. Id. at 838.
103. December 2019 Update, supra note 2.
104. Jordan & Kelly, supra note 41, at 858.
105. 953 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2020).
106. Id. at 1172.
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commercial product that was ruining its long-established trademark.107 In
response, VIP Products argued that it should be afforded First Amendment
protection as it was conveying a message and commenting humorously on
Jack Daniel’s products.108 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with Jack Daniel’s
and held that the dog toy was an “expressive work” because it conveyed a
humorous message.109 Therefore, the court accepted VIP’s First Amendment
defense under the Lanham Act.110
The appellate court considered the likelihood-of-confusion test under the
Lanham Act but determined that the test fails when “artistic expression is at
issue.”111 The likelihood-of-confusion test fails as it does not “account for
the full weight of the public’s interest in free expression.”112 By analyzing
the work as “communicating ideas or expressing points of view,” the court
decided the VIP dog toy was an “expressive work.”113 Rather than applying
the likelihood-of-confusion factors, the lower court turned to the Rogers test
which requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s use of the mark is
either “not artistically relevant to the underlying work” or “explicitly
misleads consumers as to the source or content of the work.”114 The appellate
court vacated the district court’s finding of infringement and remanded to
the district court to determine whether Jack Daniel’s product fits one of the
prongs of the Rogers test.115
On trademark dilution by tarnishment, the appellate court held that there
can be no dilution by tarnishment when the work in question is
noncommercial.116 It determined that because VIP used Jack Daniel’s trade
dress and bottle design to “convey a humorous message,” the message is
subject to First Amendment protection.117 Therefore, VIP was entitled to

107. Id. at 1174 (highlighting that Jack Daniels has established an image of
seriousness surrounding its trademark).
108. Id. at 1175.
109. Id. (finding that while the dog toy did not rise to the artistic level of the “Mona
Lisa” it still was expressive).
110. Id. at 1175–76.
111. Id. at 1174 (commenting on the likelihood-of-confusion test’s failure in these
types of cases).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (finding that when an expressive work is at issue, the likelihood-of-confusion
test is not a high enough threshold).
115. Id. at 1176.
116. Id. (concluding that when a work is expressive, it is noncommercial, so dilution
by tarnishment claims cannot survive).
117. Id. (finding that humor is an important right protected under the First
Amendment, so it deserves a high bar of analysis).
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judgment in its favor on the dilution claim.118 Jack Daniel’s filed a petition
with the Supreme Court requesting that it grant a writ of certiorari and
reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision.119
III. HOW THE NINTH CIRCUIT DELINEATES IN JACK DANIELS
The Ninth Circuit continues to use the Lanham Act to analyze trademark
infringement, but its expansion of “expressive work” and changes to the
Rogers test have differed from the Second Circuit’s original test.120 Thus,
while the Nith Circuit’s use of the test is rooted in the same purpose as the
Second Circuit, to strike a balance between First Amendment protection and
trademark rights under the Lanham Act, its expanded definition calls this
balance into question.121
A. How the Ninth Circuit’s Expanded its Definition of
“Expressive Works”
When the Ninth Circuit determined that humor can qualify a product as an
“expressive work,” it expanded the term by granting any competing product
that uses humor heightened protection.122 One of the Ninth Circuit’s first
steps in expanding the scope of the Rogers test was to apply the definition of
expressive works to commercial products used for promotion, even when
those products are considered auxiliary.123
By defining primarily
commercial products as expressive, defendants in the Ninth Circuit could use
humor to qualify any product as expressive, a relatively low bar for junior
marks to pass.124
Expanding the scope in this way allows for any commercial product using
118. Id.
119. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, VIP Prods LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc.,

953 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 20-365).
120. See Simmons, supra note 10 (observing a “foundational agreement” that First
Amendment rights must be considered in trademark infringement litigations, but
“conflicts arise in trying to draw the line”).
121. See Wilkes & Lee, supra note 77 (stating that defendants are “quick” to assert
First Amendment defenses and the Rogers test seeks to balance these defenses with
Lanham Act claims).
122. Compare VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props. Inc., 953 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th
Cir. 2020) (holding humor alone is enough to deem a work expressive), with HarleyDavidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that when a
competing product uses humor to separate itself from a senior mark, the competing
product needs to convey a message).
123. See Twentieth Century Fox TV v. Empire Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 1196–
97 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding auxiliary products used to promote an expressive work was
a natural extension of Rogers).
124. See Kagan, supra note 16.
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a trademark in a humorous way to be considered an “expressive work.”125
This diverges from the original purpose of the Lanham Act, to protect against
customer confusion regarding trademarks.126 Allowing humor alone to
negate consumer confusion contravenes the original protections since the
Second Circuit’s likelihood-of-confusion standard is meant to protect against
humor being considered alone in place of a list of factors.127 Moreover, when
determining whether something is expressive, the courts are best suited to
analyze if the product provides commentary on the original work.128 As
established by Harley-Davidson, Inc., humor can be a factor, but humor
alone is not enough to deem a product an “expressive work.”129
In the Second Circuit, humor alone is not enough to express an idea or
offer commentary unless there is a substantial message behind it.130 Thus, if
a commercial product’s primary purpose is for the sale of goods and not
commenting on the original work, then it cannot be expressive.131
Commercial products and expressive works often conflict because they are
afforded different levels of protection under the First Amendment.132 The
Harley Davidson court held that a product using a humorous representation
of another product, especially that of a competitor, for self-promotion cannot
be both expressive and commercial.133 Therefore, considering humor alone
gives heightened First Amendment protection to products that base their

125. Bill Donahue, Jack Daniel’s Takes Dog Toy TM Fight to Supreme Court,
LAW360 (Sept. 21, 2020, 4:16 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/1312109/jackdaniel-s-takes-dog-toy-tm-fight-to-supreme-court (arguing that the Ninth Circuit
expanded the scope by affording jokes too much First Amendment protection).
126. See Twentieth Century Fox TV, 875 F.3d at 1196 (explaining when the Court
applies the Rogers test).
127. See Kagan, supra note 16 (explaining that the low threshold of considering
humor still leaves great risk for consumer confusion); see also December 2019 Update,
supra note 2 (stating that the Second Circuit uses eight factors in their likelihood-ofconfusion test).
128. See Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999)
(citing Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)) (holding commentary
is necessary when humor is involved).
129. Id. at 812 (highlighting that the use of humor does not automatically make the
product not commercial).
130. Id. at 812–13 (relaying that humor can be a factor but the humor needs to relate
to the “original composition”).
131. See id. at 813 (conveying that the use of humor is not an automatic marker for
expressive works and court must consider the purpose of the humor).
132. Simmons, supra note 10.
133. See Harley-Davidson, Inc., 164 F.3d at 812 (noting examples where the court
has offered “considerable leeway” to parody products so long as their expressive work
is attempting to provide humorous commentary, not attempting to promote or sell the
product).
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designs on senior trademarks and leaves very little room for trademark
owners to prevail on infringement claims.134
The Ninth Circuit built upon the Rogers test by expanding the definition
of expressive works to include commercial products, thus, establishing a
high threshold for Lanham Act claimants.135 The heightened threshold
burdens plaintiffs with proving that the product was “explicitly misleading”
rather than just that its likelihood-of-confusion was “particularly
compelling.”136 The Ninth Circuit expands the Rogers test because it defines
traditionally non-expressive works as expressive works.137
Under the Lanham Act, the Rogers test should only be used when the
product is deemed expressive.138 Through the Ninth Circuit’s expansion of
the definition of “expressive work,” the Rogers test can be applied more
broadly than it can in the Second Circuit.139 The Lanham Act seeks to protect
trademark owners, and by using the Rogers test in a way that seeks to protect
junior trademarks, it strays from protecting senior trademark owners.140 In
the Second Circuit, when a work is non-expressive, the Lanham Act only
requires a likelihood-of-confusion analysis.141 The Ninth Circuit has
completely disregarded this analysis.142 Compared to the Ninth Circuit, the
Second Circuit’s definition of “expressive work” is aligned with the Rogers’
test initial purpose.143 The Second Circuit has not strayed from the original
intentions of the Lanham Act which seeks to protect against commercial
134. See Kagan, supra note 16.
135. See December 2019 Update, supra note 2 (discussing how the Ninth Circuit

requires a stricter explicitly misleading inquiry instead of the likelihood-of-confusion
inquiry applied by other courts in Rogers analyses).
136. Id.
137. See Kagan, supra note 16 (noting there was no precedent behind the Ninth
Circuit choosing to define non-expressive works as expressive).
138. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Protection of Artistic Expression from
Lanham Act Claims Under Rogers v. Grimaldi, 857 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), 22 A.L.R.
FED. 3d Art. 4 (2017).
139. See Kagan, supra note 16 (stating that the Ninth Circuit’s definition of expressive
work is far beyond what is traditionally accepted, which poses a large risk to trademark
owners).
140. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (“A person who has a bona fide intention,
under circumstances showing the good faith of such person, to use a trademark in
commerce may request registration of its trademark on the principal register . . . .”).
141. Trademarks and Expressive Works, STITES & HARBISON PLLC (Apr. 28, 2015),
https://www.stites.com/resources/trademarkology/trademarks-and-expressive-works.
142. See December 2019 Update, supra note 2.
143. See Kagan, supra note 16(stating the Second Circuit has defined expressive
products to include traditionally expressive works such as movies, titles, songs, and the
like, while the Ninth Circuit has gone beyond this to include consumer goods in its
definition).
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activities that may cause consumers to believe a “false designation of
orientation.”144
The Second Circuit has adhered to the plain language of the Lanham Act,
even when humor is involved, by analyzing how consumers may confuse
products before applying the Rogers test.145 When commercial products are
involved, the Second Circuit, unlike the Ninth, is cautious to consider a
product an “expressive work.”146 By accounting for factors other than humor
when determining whether a work should be classified as expressive or
commercial, the Second Circuit does not stray from the purpose of the
Lanham Act, which is to avoid customer confusion.147 This cautiousness
strikes a proper balance between trademark rights and First Amendment
rights148 and has led the Second Circuit to use the likelihood-of-confusion
factors before applying the Rogers test when non-expressive works are at
issue.149 The Second Circuit correctly analyzes an “expressive work”
because it has not classified consumer goods as such.150 When a work is not
expressive, it does not require the Rogers test to establish a claim under the
Lanham Act.151 Therefore, the analysis better adheres to the plain language
of the Lanham Act with its use of Rogers test, unlike the Ninth Circuit.
B. How the Ninth Circuit’s Rogers Test Deviates from the
Second Circuit’s Rogers Test
The Second Circuit’s Rogers test considers the likelihood-of-confusion
factors in its second prong analysis.152 Ultimately, the second prong of the

144. See Trademarks and Expressive Works, supra note 141 (showing how the
Lanham Act was used in the development of the Rogers test).
145. See BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 177 (2004) (finding that
when a statute is being analyzed “the inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends
there as the text is unambiguous”); see also Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164
F.3d 806, 812 (2d Cir. 1999) (exploring the court’s hesitation to give consumer products
with generic names trademark protections).
146. Compare Harley-Davidson, Inc., 164 F.3d at 812 (looking at competing products
and addition of commentary before establishing a product as expressive), with Gordon
v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 268–69 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding a product was
expressive because it was a greeting card with humor).
147. Trademarks and Expressive Works, supra note 141.
148. See id. (noting a needed balance between First Amendment rights and Lanham
Act protections).
149. December 2019 Update, supra note 2.
150. Kagan, supra note 16(stating plainly expressive works as “movies, songs,
photographs, television shows, video games, and greeting cards”).
151. See December 2019 Update, supra note 2 (showing that the Second Circuit does
not apply the Rogers test if it analyzes the work and concludes that it is not-expressive).
152. Id.
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Rogers test requires a claimant to show that the product “explicitly misleads
consumers as to the source or content of the work.”153 The likelihood of
confusion factors are rooted in the Polaroid factors .154 Using the likelihoodof-confusion factors when analyzing the second prong follows the plain
language of the Lanham Act.155
The Lanham Act uses the phrase “likely to cause confusion” as a
determining factor in trademark infringement cases.156 The Second Circuit
incorporates that language into their analysis of the Rogers test, showing that
even though the Rogers test is judicially created, it adheres to the original
purpose of the Lanham Act.157 The Second Circuit further strikes more of a
balance between trademark rights and First Amendment rights as it provides
consistent, efficacious resolution of trademark infringement suits.158 This
allows plaintiffs to argue more for trademark infringement as the likelihoodof-confusion factors the Second Circuit employs are a less rigid standard
than the Ninth Circuit’s second prong.159 The likelihood-of-confusion
factors also allow the courts to consider more factors for analysis, which
enables courts to separate expressive works from commercial products more
easily.160 This is a better standard because analyzing more factors allows the
court to better balance First Amendment and trademark rights, and allows
both defendants and plaintiffs more opportunities to prove their arguments.
This is legally significant because it creates a standard that does not give
more protection to one trademark over another.
The Ninth Circuit deemed the likelihood-of-confusion factors irrelevant
in its application of the second prong of the Rogers test.161 Instead, the Ninth
153. Id. (showing how the Second Circuit interprets the same language differently
than the Ninth Circuit in their Rogers test).
154. Id.
155. See Lanham Act, supra note 19 (stating that the Lanham Act requires a trademark
be “distinctive” so the trademark can aid in “identifying and distinguishing particular
goods as emanating from one producer or source and not another”).
156. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
157. See December 2019 Update, supra note 2 (highlighting that the Second Circuit
uses the same language as the Lanham Act while the Ninth Circuit has adopted a different
standard).
158. See Kagan, supra note 16 (stating trademark owners subject to Ninth Circuit
jurisdiction must be “vigilant” about protecting their marks as this circuit’s high bar does
not protect trademark owner’s rights).
159. See December 2019 Update, supra note 2 (stating that the Ninth Circuit only
looks at “explicit indication, overt claim, or explicit misstatement”); see also Thomas
M. Byron, Spelling Confusion: Implications of the Ninth Circuit’s View of the
“Explicitly Misleading” Prong of the Rogers Test, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2011).
160. See Byron, supra note 159, at 2–3, 12–14.
161. VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props, Inc., 953 F.3d 1170, 1174–75 (9th Cir.
2020) (holding the likelihood-of-confusion factors are not enough); see also December
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Circuit requires a claimant to show an “explicit indication, overt claim, or
explicit misstatement” to meet the second prong.162 The Ninth Circuit
developed this with substantial judicial discretion163 by pulling from
different analyses in the Sixth and Second Circuits to broaden its
consideration to include “overt misrepresentation.”164
The Ninth Circuit then expanded its interpretation in Twentieth Century
Fox, by developing the factors of “explicit indication, overt claim, or
explicit misstatement.”165 It cited Rogers in Twentieth Century Fox to
highlight where these factors stemmed from in the Second Circuit.166
However, the Second Circuit does not use these factors, and they are not
mentioned in Rogers nor the Lanham Act.167
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis strays from the original language
of the Lanham Act and the original use of the Rogers test.168 Thus, not
only would the Jack Daniels case not require the Rogers test if the Ninth
Circuit correctly interpreted expressive works, but if the dog toy was to
be considered an “expressive work,” the Ninth Circuit did not apply the
Rogers test correctly.
C. Possible Implications After Jack Daniels
The Rogers test has evolved from being used for titles of movies to
applying to video games and gift cards and now to auxiliary products and
dog toys.169 The bar for artistically relevant was made low so that the First
2019 Update, supra note 2.
162. Twentieth Century Fox TV v. Empire Distrib. Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 1199 (9th
Cir. 2017) (using the language from the Ninth Circuit to highlight the differences in the
application of the Rogers test between the Second and Ninth Circuits).
163. See id. (stating that the Ninth Circuit created this interpretation on its own;
therefore, creating a divide in how the Ninth and Second Circuit use the Rogers test).
164. See Byron, supra note 159, at 4–5.
165. Twentieth Century Fox TV, 875 F.3d at 1199.
166. Id.; see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
167. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d
994 (2d Cir. 1989); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Grp., Inc., 886
F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989); Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir.
1999).
168. See Joshua Besser, False Endorsement or First Amendment?: An Analysis of
Celebrity Trademark Rights and Artistic Expression, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1787, 1795
(2004) (stating that the purpose of the Lanham Act is to prevent consumer confusion as
to the source of the product); see also Kagan, supra note 16 (stating the Ninth Circuit’s
First Amendment protections are denying trademark owners the ability to differentiate
their trademarks).
169. See VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., 953 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2020)
(finding a dog toy to be an expressive work); see William K. Ford, Restoring Rogers:
Video Games, False Association Claims, and the “Explicitly Misleading” Use of
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Amendment would have continued protection.170 However, this shift in
allowing commercial products to be considered as expressive works when
they contain a humorous message creates a new balance between First
Amendment rights and trademark protections.171 This new balance could be
concerning for trademark owners but favorable for creators.172 As trademark
owners are recognizing that commercial products such as dog toys pass the
Rogers test when they involve humor, the question arises: what products
will be excluded from passing the Rogers test?173
However, the shift in allowing humor in commercial products to be
deemed as expressive is not happening in the Second Circuit.174 The
differences between Ninth Circuit’s Rogers test and the Second Circuit’s
Rogers test remain intact and enable the circuits to decide similar matters
differently.175 This difference in how the circuits are using the test leads to
a difference in protection for brand owners depending on where the case is
tried.176 This raises concerns for forum shopping, as trademark owners will
want to try their cases in the Second Circuit as it is a more favorable forum
for them.177
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit in VIP Products, expanded the definition of expressive
work because it only considered humor when the court should have
Trademarks, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 306, 308–09 (2017) (listing films,
magazines, video games, and greeting cards as things currently considered as noncommercial expressive works).
170. See Ford, supra note 169, at 314–15.
171. Jared I. Kagan & Emily R. Hush, Parody Chew Toys and the First Amendment,
13 LANDSLIDE 22 (2021) (describing the Ninth Circuit’s VIP decision as potentially
“disrupting the fine balance between the Lanham Act and free speech”).
172. See Bad Spaniels Dog Toys — Expressive Art or Noisy Trademark Infringers?,
TAFT (Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.taftlaw.com/news-events/law-bulletins/bad-spanielsdog-toys-expressive-art-or-noisy-trademark-infringers.
173. See id. (stating trademark holders may need to use “hyper-vigilance” when
protecting their marks).
174. See Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999)
(stating “a trademark parody that endeavors to promote primarily non-expressive
products” is not entitled to First Amendment protection).
175. See December 2019 Update, supra note 2 (discussing the continuing differences
in the Second and Ninth Circuits).
176. See Jared Kagan & Jeremy Feigelson, Will SCOTUS Tell Bad Spaniels to Roll
Over?, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/10/22/willscotus-tell-bad-spaniels-roll/id=126606/ (stating concerns over the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in ruling a dog toy as an expressive work).
177. See id. (pointing out that the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago
is concerned over the forum shopping risk the Ninth Circuit is creating).
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considered humor, commentary, and competing products.178 Therefore,
using the product in question, a dog toy, the Ninth Circuit expanded
expressive works to cover commercial products.179 This is a delineation from
the Second Circuit, which uses commentary upon the original mark and
humor as tools to determine if a work is expressive.180 However, there are
differences with the circuits’ uses of the Rogers test. The Second Circuit
applies the likelihood-of-confusion factors to its Rogers test analysis while
the Ninth Circuit uses the factors: ‘explicit indication,’ ‘overt claim,’ or
‘explicit misstatement.’181 Overall, the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit’s
differences in determining expressive works and use of the Rogers test are
creating a lack of uniformity. VIP Products is one of many cases that
highlights the differences in how the Ninth Circuit progressed the Rogers
test and how the circuits’ different applications will likely need to be
resolved by the Supreme Court.

178.
179.
180.
181.

See Kagan, supra note 16.
Id.
See, e.g., Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 813 (2d Cir. 1999).
Twentieth Century Fox TV v. Empire Distrib. Inc., 875 F.3d 1199, 1199 (9th Cir.
2017); see Kagan, supra note 16.

